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BOOK REVIEW
A New Legal Realism for Criminal Procedure
ROBERT WEISBERGt
Marc Miller and Ronald Wright have produced perhaps
the most original criminal procedure book' in many years,
because it departs more than any other casebook from the
conventional model of building all material around United
States Supreme Court cases.
American criminal procedure law is a fairly recent
academic enterprise tending to focus on the Warren Court's
supposed revolution in using the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments as new constraints on prosecutorial and police
power.2 Focus on Supreme Court cycles has "typecast"
American criminal procedure in terms of measuring and
evaluating the Warren Court's jurisprudence and the
Court's supposed retreat from it.' We often speak of the
Warren era as if it were a long, major phase in our history,
but it was not long after the retirement of Earl Warren that
scholars started narrating, lamenting, or occasionally
approving the perceived demise of his Court'sjurisprudence.4 Though many scholars have noted that the
t Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr. Professor of Law, Stanford University
1. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRzInNAL PROCEDURES: CASES,
STATUTES, AND ExEcuTIvE MATERIALS (1998).
2. E.g., A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67
MICH. L. Rev. 249 (1968).
3. See Robert Weisberg, Foreword: Some Versions of the Skeptical, 76 J.
CRni. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 832 (1985).
4. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Criminal
Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 1512 (1980); Carol S.
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Supreme Court's shift from due process to crime control
caselaw has been much misunderstood, both its rise and fall
overstated,5 the academic field has struggled to find a more
useful identity than that of a Supreme Court observation
post. Despite the recent clear, if half-hearted, reaffirmation
of Miranda v. Arizona,6 three decades after Warren's
departure the direction of the Court has been
straightforward; the police and prosecutor win most of the
constitutional cases regarding issues involving the Bill of
Rights-issues which were opened up by the Warren Court.
For example, the Court has firmly reinforced the trend of
granting huge discretionary powers of perception and
rationalization to police in Terry v. Ohio7, especially _police
power to stop and search drivers and their associates. Most
of the very subtle permutations of cases establishing the
power to stop on reasonable suspicion, to search incident to
arrest,9 and to search vehicles -permutations that were
recently thought of as interesting and open questions-have
now been settled as well within the range of police power.
Somehow it seems beside the point now in addressing these
situations to revive what would have been the Justice
Brennan or Marshall rhetoric in dissent. Similarly, scholars
have now recognized that despite the survival of Miranda,
American police have found plenty of room "outside"
Miranda to induce unwarned or uncounseled statements
that might prove very useful in prosecutions,11 or to use
subtle but powerful forms of persuasion that manage to
stay just on the legal side of Miranda's coercion rules."
Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996).
5. E.g., Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-
Minded?), the Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution Oriented?) and Police
Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT
WASN'T 62 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
6. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
7. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting a stop and frisk of
suspects upon reasonable cause to believe crime has been committed or that
criminal activity may be "afoot").
8. See Wyoming v. Houghton , 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (permitting search of
containers owned or possessed by passenger of suspect-driver).
9. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
10. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
11. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109,
154-62 (1998).
12. Id. at 158.
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Nevertheless, the Warren Court model still abounds in
casebooks. Two of the leading publishers issue textbooks
which are composed mostly of major Supreme Court cases
and have very few notes and questions, much less other
case material or non-case material." Most of the other
conventional textbooks build their chapters around the
major Supreme Court cases as well, with other Supreme
Court cases and non-case material coming in only for
illustration. The reason is partly the usual one-Supreme
Court cases are simply the easiest building blocks. And-let
us be honest pedagogues-they are the most "test-able" of
material, providing the optimal doctrinal rigor and
complexity mix for fair and replicable examination
questions. But it is not solely a matter of convenience. For a
generation of law students, the Warren Court's major
cases-Terry v. Ohio,"4 Miranda v. Arizona, Mapp v.
Ohio, 6 and so on-have actually constituted the very field of
criminal procedure. The field has been defined as whatever
the Supreme Court says, due especially to a widespread
assumption that the states have chosen not to extend
defendants' rights beyond the federal guarantees; rather,
relevant state statutes either contain trivial details that are
only of local relevance or simply track the federal doctrines.
Miller & Wright refuse to both accept and expand this
assumption. They offer instead a unique mix of what one
might call "street-level federalism" and local separation-of-
powers struggles. Federalism has little to do with the large
abstract commerce questions revived in recent years."
Rather, Miller & Wright believe that federalism has to do
with states treating Supreme Court precedent as a fixity
but using state constitutions and state statutes-and even
sub-statutory administrative regulations-to provide a
deeper level of law to govern courts, prosecutors, and police.
As for separation-of-powers doctrine, again Miller & Wright
believe that it is not a matter of grand constitutional
abstraction, but rather the local government version of
systems analysis: dynamic turf battles among police,
13. See JEROLD ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION
(2000); see also LLOYD WEINREB, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL CASES ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (2000).
14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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prosecutors, magistrates, and other officials, to work out
how discretion in arresting, charging, incarcerating, and
bargaining gets exercised.
In the typically case-heavy areas of search-and-seizure
and interrogation law, most of Miller & Wright's lead cases
are obscure state supreme court cases, and the federal
constitutional doctrine comes in through a process of
inversion-either the lead case is an explicit application of
the federal cases and interprets the federal doctrine in its
own text, or the application is indirect or implicit, and the
notes to the case then introduce the federal case. The
advantages are several: first, we get newer and fresher fact
patterns to test the major doctrines; second we get some
flavor for how different state courts interpret open Supreme
Court doctrine on unresolved issues; third, we see where
states use statutes or their own constitutions to alter the
federal rules explicitly; and finally, we are spared the often
gratuitous exercise of parsing fine differences among
Justices' individual opinions-a matter better left to
general constitutional law courses. After all, in criminal
procedure, the police, line prosecutors, and defense lawyers
are the major consumers of the doctrine, and the
professorial fascination with opinion-analysis is often
irrelevant. At the same time, for those instructors who
appreciate Supreme Court doctrine for its generality and
consequent test-ability, the Miller & Wright approach is a
challenge. 8
Miller & Wright's approach to Terry v. Ohio illustrates
the subtle virtues, and perhaps the subtler pedagogic risks,
of this approach." Terry and its extension in United States
v. Mendenhall" are introduced through a Wyoming case,
Wilson v. State.2 In Wilson, police encountered a drunken
man and, purportedly for reasons of protecting him,
detained him briefly. During this time, the police ran his
name through a computer data base of arrest warrants. The
Wyoming Supreme Court, construing both the federal and
state constitutions, held this to be a seizure requiring
reasonable cause and thus suppressed all consequent
18. This review does not address, but needs to acknowledge, the very useful
supplementary material made available by the editors through a website,
http://www.crimpro.com, coordinated with the book.
19. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 43-45.
20. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
21. 874 P.2d 215 (Wyo. 1994).
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evidence. Wilson thereby becomes a fine example of the
consequential meaning of Terry: after establishing that
suspicion stops and weapon frisks can be done on less than
probable cause, Terry unleashed into federal law a variety
of possibilities for police intervention in special contexts on
far lesser justification than would be necessary for an arrest
or full search. After all, from drug-testing to immigration
checkpoint stops, from administrative searches to
schoolroom searches, the courts have found amgle help in
Terry in expanding search-and-detention power. It is only
in the background law of the Wilson opinion that students
first encounter Terry; thus, they do so in a context not
implicated in Terry itself; since in Wilson, the police did not
do a gun-frisk, nor did they rationalize their action on any
inference of imminent criminal activity. So, students must
reason inversely to appreciate the original Terry doctrine. It
is only later in the book that Terry itself is offered,' and
there for the purpose of introducing weapon frisks and
suspicion stops. Thus, students will ultimately learn Terry
in its full breadth, but not in the easily digestible form of
other casebooks; furthermore, the instructor must add to
the doctrinal toolkit methods for discerning when a state
court has gone beyond federal law, and what patterns of
extra-federal protection have general practice in the
country today.
But Miller & Wright go far beyond even this innovative
federalism. Even in the most doctrine-friendly areas, like
searches and seizures, they give primary attention to
statistical studies and policy memoranda from police and
prosecutors, and these become important components of the
book. Though constitutional cases cover some important
questions, the heart of the matter for Miller & Wright lies
in understanding statutory rules, judicial custom, and the
raw economics and sociology of criminal justice.
The book starts, strikingly, with material describing the
role of the police, and the nature of their caretaking and
patrolling assignments.24 The point to be made is that
regular casebooks take a very narrow view of the typical
police-citizen confrontation, but Miller & Wright want to
show police in their full variety of roles-from social worker
22. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDuRE 279-300
(2d ed. 1996).
23. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 113.
24. See id. at 3-36.
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to civility-enforcer. Thus, they illustrate how petty
substantive crimes like disturbing the peace or (somewhat
less petty) resisting arrest become the rationale for police
intervention.2
With perfect timing, Miller & Wright included
materials on that trendy but vague category of new
enforcement methods called "community policing,"
2 6
including even a lengthy memorandum on community
policing by New York and Houston police chief Lee Brown",
which is a combination of bureaucratic training manual,
motivational speech, and policy apologia. Moreover, Miller
& Wright include state statutes on stops and seizures, with
several purposes in mind: to cause students to learn the art
of statute reading, as opposed to case crunching; to
illustrate jurisdictional differences in standards; and also to
offer a sort of sociological taxonomy of police-citizen
encounters. Thus, a detailed Akron, Ohio ordinance on
Terry stops28 serves both as an illustration of the
administrative or bureaucratic thinking that must guide
individual police, as well as, by more than coincidence, a
useful doctrinal summary of the sorts of factors that have
been invoked by courts as neither necessary nor sufficient
for, but highly relevant to, legitimate searches and seizures.
Thus, Akron police are specifically instructed that a
purpose to engage in drug-related activity can be
established, for example, when a person "displays physical
characteristics of drug intoxication or usage, such as needle
tracks, burned or callused thumb and index fingers,
underweight, or nervous and excited behavior" or when he
"transfers small objects or packages in a furtive fashion."29
Miller & Wright do not rely on the standard Tery-derived
profile cases, such as United States v. Sokolow or Florida v.
Royer,30  where enumeration of neither-necessary-nor-
sufficient factors in fractured plurality opinions means that
the Supreme Court can offer police no clear guidance.
Instead, Miller & Wright offer a documented police profiling
instruction chart. Similarly, instead of relying on Michigan
25. See id. at 4-20.
26. See id. at 20-27.
27. Id. at 23-26.
28. Id. at 66-67.
29. Id.
30. 490 U.S. 1 (1989); 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
914 [Vol. 49
CRIMINAL PROCED URES
Dept. of Police v. Sitz,3 ' a case involving drunk-driving
checkpoints or roadblocks and how these roadblocks work,
Miller & Wright introduce actual police memoranda
governing the checkpoint procedure."
Miller & Wright reach back into history as well to
provide some groundwork on criminal procedure. Instead of
the typical brief expository introduction to the colonial
background of the Fourth Amendment, they offer the actual
texts of the legendary opinions in Entick v. Carrington and
the Writs of Assistance cases." These provide a
philosophical motivation for the later warrant
requirements. As for warrant requirements, Miller &
Wright include forgotten but vital early nineteenth century
cases on the need for warrant specificity. Thus, they
unearth this striking passage from the ancient case of
Grummon v. Raymond:
That this warrant was such as no justice ought to have issued will
be admitted; for it is not only a warrant to search for stolen goods
supposed to be concealed in a particular place, but it is a warrant
to searching all suspected places, stores, shops, and barns in
Wilton. Where those suspected places were in Wilton is not
pointed out, or by whom suspected.... The officer was also
directed to search suspected persons, and arrest them. By whom
they were suspected, whether by the justice, the officer, or
complainant, is not mentioned; so that every citizen of the United
States within the jurisdiction of the justice to try for theft, was
liable to be arrested and carried before the justice for trial.3 4
This historical admonition about the venerable reasons
for distrusting broad warrants becomes quite contemporary
with Miller & Wright's inclusion of a highly original chart
listing the actual phrasings of state law criteria for
searches and seizures;35 these remind students that the
simple phrases "reasonable cause" or "probable cause" may
not fully capture the sort of "articulation" with which local
police must justify their actions.
Miller & Wright reach forward as well, introducing a
special section on technological searches, grouped into such
31. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
32. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 87-93.
33. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765); Quincy's Rep. (Mass.) 1:402 (1755).
34. Grummon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40 (1814), reprinted in MILLER &
WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 188.
35. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 145.
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categories as dog sniffs, beepers, infrared sensors, and
intelligent vehicle highway systems. They also look at the
Fourth Amendment in cyberspace, including FBI Director
Freeh's statement on encryption and material on computer
hacking and government protection of Internet Service
Providers. 6
Nevertheless, the key to the book remains the below-
the-constitutional-radar legal sociology of criminal
procedure. In laying out the criteria for search warrant
affidavits based on confidential information, Miller &
Wright, instead of merely including Illinois v. Gates37 or
caselaw derived from it, reproduce an actual 'Wanted"
poster inviting citizens to identify drug dealers and
promising the informants confidentiality, along with a
detailed model of a search warrant application.38 They also
include a fascinating Cincinnati police protocol 9 for police
use of informants; this provides, for example, that police
officers must never give confidential informants internal
police operations information, must supervise the
informants with rigorous interviewing rules, and must
ensure that the informants waive the usual protections
under local strip search protocols.
Miller & Wright demonstrate that though
constitutional doctrine is often vague and general, police
are usually trained to conduct searches and seizures in
highly specific categories. Students are urged to look past
the general doctrine to the acts. They learn this via Miller
& Wright's demonstration that police officers themselves
are required to do fine factual "issue spotting." In effect,
what we force students to do on exams bears an ironic
resemblance to the justifications and articulations that
police officers must give to their supervisors and courts to
account for their actions. Hence, Miller & Wright excerpt a
police memorandum enumerating precise (and graphic)
criteria for strip searches and body cavity searches."
Similarly, they include a training protocol by which police
are instructed to use force in arrests.4' This remarkable
document is a veritable Gray's Anatomy of legitimate and
36. See id. at 523-26.
37. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
38. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 163.
39. See id. at 767-68.
40. See id. at 247-49.
41., See id. at 378.
[Vol. 49916
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illegitimate body parts for seizure, using Foucaultian
vocabulary like "official presence," "verbal control,"
"physical control," "intermediate weapons," "incapacitating
conduct," "pain compliance," and ultimately escalating to
permissible deadly force. This matrix makes it far easier for
students to understand the issues in a Rodney King-type
case.
The material on arrest criteria is enriched by an
example of special local guidelines governing. arrests in
domestic abuse cases, along with a study evaluating the
success of the famed Minneapolis experiment, which
concluded that arrest was the most effective way to reduce
domestic violence." In the chapters on interrogation,
beyond the oft-included statistical studies of the effects of
Miranda, Miller & Wright include material on the unique
Alaska rule requiring videotaping of confessions and
holding that the requirement amounts to a defendant's
statutory right.43 Similarly, the chapter on identifications
admonishes students that most of the "law" of lineups is
subconstitutional departmental policy, since the n orous-
appearing requirements of United States v. Wade apply
only in the rare case of lineups after indictment or
arraignment. Therefore, Miller & Wright sensibly focus
their identification material on the administrative
protocols45 which were enacted after Wade but retained
even after Kirby v. Illinois essentially nullified Wade.46
They are also happy to cross the conventional boundary
between criminal procedure and substantive criminal law
when doing so illuminates police practice; hence, following
the introductory material on the "substantive crime" of
resisting arrest, they include materials on entrapment
doctrine, because it is just as relevant to constraining
police procedure as it is to the metaphysics of a defendant's
mental state.
Miller & Wright cast the right to counsel in a rich new
perspective with some legal realism about who criminal
42. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN & RICHARD A. BERK, THE MINNEAPOLIS DOMSTIC
VIOLENCE EXPERIMENT (1984).
43. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 673-82.
44. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
45. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 728-29.
46. 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (holding that only the looser due process standard
applies to lineups conducted before formal charges are issued).
47. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 761-65.
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lawyers are and what they are logistically able to do. They
link the classic Powell v. Alabama4 case to the sociology of
contemporary criminal practice by offering a local example
of the specific qualifications a county court sets for
appointed counsel. 9 Miller & Wright also include material
on defendants' challenges to public defender overloads, the
courts' failure to obey statutory requirements for timely
payments to defense counsel, and institutional details on
contract attorney systems. °
As for bail, beyond the typical inclusion of United States
v. Salerno5 to introduce pretrial detention, Miller & Wright
include material on statutory requirements of consultation
with victims, 52 and details on the bureaucratic dynamics of
charging decisions, including requirements of face-to-face
conversations between police and prosecutors, rather than
electronic processes." They offer useful details on local bail
"scoring systems, "54 as many casebooks do, but they also
include innovative materials on bail in special contexts-
especially domestic violence.
For example, judges of one county in Washington State
enacted a policy of denying pretrial release to alleged
domestic abusers. The judges not only provoked a petition
by the defendant, but they also clashed with police, who
claimed statutory authority to set bail in their discretion
(and also, by implication, the legislature). Construing state
constitutional law and immemorial practice, the
Washington Supreme Court concluded that bail-setting was
enough of an inherently judicial function to permit reading
the statute as allowing the prohibitory policy, and denied
that distinguishing domestic abuse from other allegations
violated equal protection. This is the sort of street-level
tangle of larger separation-of-powers questions that simply
cannot get raised by federally-focused casebooks. Though it
does not produce testable material in the conventional,
uniform way, it certainly permits and enables instructors to
devise parallel problems that call on students to replicate
48. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
49. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 866-67.
50. See id. at 871-78.
51. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
52. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 933-39.
53. See id. at 958-60.
54. See id. at 909-16.
55. See Westerman v. Cary, 885 P.2d 827 (Wash. 1994).
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and criticize the questions of inherent power and
institutional competence raised here. Plus, Miller & Wright
augment this local caselaw with statistical studies to
explore the apparent non-uniformity of bail decisions,
concluding that the desire of district attorneys-
independent of, and often in the face of, objective evidence
of local ties or low severity of charge-determines bail,
regardless of the views of others in the system."
The two sections that most exploit the innovative
conception of the casebook are the related ones on
prosecutorial discretion and plea bargains. Here, Miller &
Wright's unique approach to federalism and separation-of-
powers pays off the most. The 1996 Anti-Terrorism and
Habeas Corpus Reform Act" has pulled the jurisdictional
rug out from under the decades-long assumption that the
true arena for criminal procedure is federal court
supervision over state court enforcement of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Thus, the Act's ironically
salutary effect may be to cause lawmakers and scholars to
direct their attention to what may have been the true
center of legal action anyway-the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in its broadest sense.58 Under the Act, Congress,
rather than intervene in criminal procedure directly, has
more fundamentally, if slyly, reduced the possibility of
defendants making constitutional claims. 9 If federal courts
can only take state appeals on habeas corpus where the
56. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 931-37.
57. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-66
(Supp. II 1996)).
58. William Stuntz brilliantly addressed this notion in a recent major
article. See William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L. J. 1 (1997). Stuntz demonstrates
some of the perverse effects of a judicial commitment to court enforcement of
constitutional procedural rights as a way to induce fairness in the criminal
justice system. Put simply: we chose to add to certain procedural rights without
worrying, beyond the minimal guarantee of counsel, about fimding defense
practice. The result has been an odd skewing of criminal justice systems.
Defense lawyers find procedural and non-guilt-addressed claims cheaper to
litigate than fact-based claims addressing actual innocence or affirmative
defenses. And since it is poor clients who pose the least risk of litigating
substantive or factual claims, the state's ability to inflict disproportionate
punishment on poor and minority defendants continues unabated. Id. at 21, 27-
31.
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (providing that a habeas petitioner must show
that the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law").
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state courts have so egregiously misread or misapplied
federal constitutional law as to suggest either ignorance or
defiance of the Constitution," then the jurisprudence on Bill
of Rights issues in which modern scholarship has so
invested itself has become a world of only shadow
litigation-twice removed from any real effect in state
prosecutions. Federal courts will not ask whether state
courts are correct, but only whether the most vaguely
arguable or colorable bases for their decisions might be
found. Hence, the great jurisdictional engine of Warren
Court Bill of Rights jurisprudence, having been slowed by a
number of key Supreme Court decisions, will have been
virtually halted by Congress.
Thus, these days, more than ever, it is prosecutors (in
alliance with police, of course), not courts or juries or even
legislatures, who do most of the sorting of the guilty and
innocent. They may not conduct this screening very well if
the risk they face is largely on constitutional issues; and so,
despite the traditional liberal romantic attachment to Bill
of Rights litigation, concentration on federal constitutional
claims may narrow the gap between the odds of convicting
the guilty and the odds of convicting the innocent, since
innocence of defendants is very poorly correlated with the
availability of strong constitutional claims.6' Moreover,
much of the decried racial disproportion in outcomes is due
to fact-specific and investigation-demanding matters, such
as eyewitness identification, that get under-litigated in a
world where defense lawyers find it more economically
feasible to litigate search-and-seizure and confession issues.
In a final irony, legislation to reduce the finding defense
lawyers desperately needed to litigate factual innocence
claims is often motivated by political anger over the more
symbolically visible defense victories on "technical"
constitutional claims.
60. See Alan Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas
Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535 (1999).
61. See id. at 606. See also William Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98
CoLUM. L. REv. 1795 (1998) (Professor Stuntz asserts that there are race-
neutral and arguably constitutional reasons why prosecutors are likely to end
up prosecuting crimes that are disproportionately committed by black people. It
is where black people live disproportionately that police find it most
economically efficient to devote resources to arresting drug criminals, and is
also in those places that drug crimes tend to be most associated (causally or not)
with violent crime).
920 [Vol. 49
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Regulating prosecutorial discretion in the broader
sense, and finding legal constraints on substantive criminal
law that do not resemble "judicial legislation"-these are
tasks that seem often beyond us. Recent events such as the
multifold legal and political reaction to the "Driving While
Black" phenomenon,62 the wide public revulsion at the
perceived prosecutorial excesses of the Starr investigation,"
and related legislative efforts to address wider perceived
abuses of non-independent counsel practice' may offer
some glimmers of hope. The doctrinal consequences
following these political phenomena are much less
important than the political phenomena themselves: what
matters is that American politics has found a politically
salient way to take the problem seriously, and we must not
be obsessed with the notion that a remedy without a
doctrinal tag is ineffective.
62. See, e.g., David Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIi. L. &
CRnIINOLOGY 544 (1997); Tracey Maclin, Terry and Race: Terry v. Ohio's Fourth
Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1271 (1998). For years, in this and other areas of criminal procedure, one has
heard the occasional argument that administrative rulemaking may solve
problems that constitutional litigation cannot. E.g., James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Discretion, 94 HARV. L.REv. 1521 (1981); MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 10.3. But these calls have been weak for the
plausible reason that state agencies cannot always be trusted to monitor
themselves. However effective this new burst of rulemaking proves, the fact
that it is motivated by very vocal acknowledgements of fault and concern by
state officials is itself a huge change. Somehow, the political atmosphere has
made it possible for politicians to acknowledge and address this problem
without fear of the soft-on-crime label. Most striking is what has just happened
in New Jersey. The State Attorney General, as part of, not in spite of, his
campaign for the State Supreme Court, issued a report decrying the
disproportionate Terry-stopping of Black drivers. See David Kocieniewski,
Verniero Says Bias Issue Got Lost in Workload, N.Y. TnAIES, Apr. 24, 1999, at
B5; Iver Peterson, Whitman Says Troopers Used Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 21, 1999, at Al.
63. See Robert Weisberg, Foreword: A New Agenda for Criminal Procedure,
2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 367, 379-80 (1999). The Starr investigation has shown
something that has been inherent in modern criminal law all along: the subtle
inter-relation of substantive criminal law and procedure. We see this now on
the federal front, where the inchoate and verbal nature of modern federal
criminal acts permit the less examined procedural doctrines of grand jury and
other prosecution subpoena powers to stretch state power to the limit.
64. See The Citizen's Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277 (1998)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §530B(a)) (subjecting U.S. Attorneys to professional and
ethical rules of any jurisdiction in which they practice).
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The Miller & Wright casebook is an exception to the
general rule that American legal scholarship and pedagogy
has difficulty breaking out of the Bill of Rights trap. Most
casebooks have vague and sparse chapters dealing with the
job of prosecutors." Many are very cursory, offering a few
pages of exposition on the way that prosecutors' offices are
organized and how grand juries work with perhaps one case
merely confirming the absence of any constraints on grand
jury subpoena power,66 and a quixotic look at the poor
success rate of the efforts to bring constitutional law to bear
on selective prosecution. 67 The relentless theme of the few
cases presented in most casebooks is that there is
effectively no constitutional control of prosecutorial
decisions (and so, because the material is thereby un-
testworthy, many instructors just ignore the whole section
of the topic entirely.).
Miller & Wright try something different, presenting
true materials on the law, if not the judicial regulation, of
prosecutors. With exhaustive illustration of police
screening68 and declination policies, they describe how
prosecutors make their most crucial decisions under
administrative rules worthy of serious analysis as legal
doctrine, and they tempt us with the possibility of bringing
prosecutorial discretion into the law, albeit in new and
perhaps uncomfortably unfamiliar ways.
The material on charging and declination policy is
perhaps the most original in the book, and especially timely
in light of the national reaction to the perceived abuses of
the Independent Counsel statute and a new bipartisan
concern about prosecutorial overreaching. As on other
subjects, Miller & Wright treat the guidelines in two ways:
first, as administrative regulations which may have no
enforceability beyond bureaucratic supervision,69  and
second, as potential statutory rights of defendants under
state law. Under these guidelines prosecutions decline
because of the size of the loss in property cases" or for a
65. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE THOMAS III, CRIIINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 794-839 (1999).
66. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
67. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); United States v.
Wayte, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
68. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 956-1004.
69. See id. at 963-66.
70. See id. at 965.
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variety of factors including the antiquity of the law, the
availability of an alternate proceeding, the high
disproportionate cost of prosecution, the request of the
victim, or even the improper motive of the complainant.
7
'
1
We learn from Miller & Wright that well below the
constitutional non-doctrine of constraint on discretion,
states often take seriously the possibility of judicial
enforcement of declination and diversion policies against
prosecutors.72 Thus, the court can invalidate a prosecutor's
blanket decision to refuse pretrial diversion for a whole sub-
class of drug defendants, and the abuse of discretion
standard can be applied to a prosecutor as it can to an
agency head or lower court." For example, the Florida state
guidelines on use of habitual offender laws 4 look like a
formal statute in offering a taxonomy of classes and specific
sections for felonies so chargeable, or specified combinations
of crimes, such as number of priors and identity of new
crime. Only at the end of this section do Miller & Wright
include the almost obligatory United States v. Armstrong
7 5
and other conventional material on the almost non-existent
federal constitutional oversight of prosecutorial discretion.
Moreover, in the chapter on guilty pleas, Miller &
Wright give new vitality to the abstract notion of
separation-of-powers in the trenches of criminal justice. It
is interesting to see a higher court tell a lower court that it
cannot set rigid policies in rejecting certain types of plea
bargains," but it is fascinating to note that in some states
the courts can treat the prosecutors the same way-
imposing at least an abuse-of-discretion standard on
prosecutorial decisions to impose enhancements and
causing prosecutors to impose administrative guidelines on
themselves."
71. See id. at 968-69.
72. See State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1996) (holding that, in
extraordinary circumstances, such as where statutory rape defendant has no
criminal record, victim's family urges no prosecution, and required sex offender
registration would be unduly punitive, court may dismiss charge for
prosecutor's abuse of power to charge).
73. See State v. Baynes, 690 A.2d 594 (N.J. 1997).
74. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 1002-04.
75. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
76. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Martin, 894 P.2d 688 (Ariz. 1995) (holding that
lower courts cannot categorically prohibit negotiated sentencing stipulations).
77. See State v. Lagares, 601 A.2d 698 (N.J. 1992) (holding that a court has
the power to force a prosecutor to adopt administrative guidelines for invocation
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But the boldest aspect of this section is its inclusion of
bureaucratic history and turf-battling political science: the
sequence of Justice Department memoranda on plea
bargains preceding and following the enactment of the
Sentencing Guidelines. The sequence begins pre-Guidelines
with the 1980 Principles of Prosecution, 8 exemplifying the
fairly open discretionary system in which prosecutors were
not held accountable in any formal way to justify plea
bargains so long as individual judges did not object. Then,
after the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act, which created the
Guidelines, we have the complex 1987 Weld Redbook 9 This
document recognizes that the Guidelines restrict charge
bargaining through the "adequately reflect the seriousness"
requirement. The Weld Redbook also notes that the
Guidelines affect sentencing bargains even more by
drastically constraining the use of governmental sentencing
recommendations, while also creating a new phenomenon of
"fact bargaining." Sentences must now conform to the
Guidelines, with some allowance for specified departures
and reductions for "substantial assistance" where there are
"justifiable reasons."' ° The key insight here is that the Weld
Redbook imposes even greater constraints than the
Guidelines themselves, taking the remarkable legal
position that the Commission's own policy statements on
this subject clash with the language and intent of the 1984
Sentencing Reform Act. The Justice Department thus
opposed-and declined the invitation to use-the greater
breadth afforded by the "justifiable reasons" factor."'
Moreover, the Redbook admonishes line prosecutors not to
take undue advantage of "fact bargaining" by
disingenuously relaxing their investigatory efforts so as to
be able to make straight-face claims to judges that certain
facts are unprovable, and hence certain concessions are
legitimate. 2
Was the Justice Department sincerely reading the
statute? Was it implicitly rebuking the Commission for
failing to recognize the intra-executive problem it had
of sentencing enhancements for drug offenders, even where there is no stautory
limit on the prosecutor's discretion).
78. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 1295-97.
79. Id. at 1299-1300.
80. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL §§6B1.2, 6B1.4 (1999).
81. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 1300-1303.
82. See id. at 1303.
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created? Students now must confront an unexpected
wrinkle in the separation-of-powers problem: the intra-
executive conflict between the Justice Department, seeking
some semblance of national uniformity in pleas and
sentences, and line United States Attorneys, who naturally
want to maximize their autonomy.8 The 1989 Thornburgh
Bluesheet and the 1992 Terwilliger Bluesheet' both
enhance this centralized uniformity by tightening up
substantive standards, especially in regard to fact
bargaining, and stressing recordkeeping and internal
review. However, the 1993 Reno Bluesheeti5 appears to go
the other way - decentralizing power back to line attorneys
in a manner reminiscent of 1980, and we learn that this odd
reversion may reflect yet another institutional conflict: the
Justice Department was shoring up the power of United
States Attorneys in the face of congressional rebukes over
allegedly lenient sentencing.86
This is not legal doctrine in any conventional casebook
sense, but it poses the same analytic challenges for
students-they must understand the tension between rules
and standards, argue policy and institutional competence,
and hypothesize arguments from explicit and customary
authority. Indeed, it can even produce testable questions, if
instructors are willing to accede to this unusual context
(and take advantage of the many hypo-problems the editors
insert to guide the teaching).
To return to more generic local problems of guilty pleas,
it is useful to remind students that prosecutors often
consult with and defer to victims or victims' families in
deciding whether to make a plea deal, but it is eye-opening
to learn that a state court may treat this practice as a
dereliction of statutory duty." Most casebooks cite the
general principle that a guilty plea must be knowing and
83. See id. at 1300-03.
84. Id. at 1303-05.
85. Id. at 1306.
86. See id. at 1307.
87. See State v. McDonnell, 837 P.2d 941 (Or. 1992). In this case, the
prosecutor assumed that the family of the murder victim would approve the
guilty plea to a life sentence; but the family refused, and the defendant
complained that the prosecutor wrongly gave the family full power to control
the plea. The court held that the prosecutor had contemplated a capital charge
anyway and had consulted family only on the chance that the family wanted a
plea bargain, so there was no violation of prosecutor's statutory duty that
prejudiced defendant.
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voluntary, and perhaps offer an example of where a
defendant's misinformation about a sentencing consequence
is material enough to undermine his plea,88 but none, so far
as I know, has offered cases where defendants and
prosecutors joust with each other about whether they were
materially misinformed about the evidence before
committing to a deal.89 Most casebooks mention that judges
are discouraged from participating in plea bargains, but in
Miller & Wright's casebook, we see at what point that
involvement might undo the plea." Finally, separation-of-
powers and federalism take on street-level significance
when a state court confronts an almost insoluble problem of
rescission.9'
I will make some brief observations about some of the
other chapters, beginning with jury challenges. In the area
of juror selection, before the unavoidable treatment of
discriminatory peremptories in Batson v. Kentucky9 and
post-Batson cases, Miller & Wright include unusual but
very refreshing material on a logically prior issue: the
circumstances under which lawyers can use challenge for
cause to dismiss jurors for racial bias9 -an excellent
corrective to the great modern stress on peremptories. And
though most criminal law teachers at some point in their
courses casually mention Allen v. United States or dynamite
88. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 916 P.2d 405 (Wash. 1996) (distinguishing "direct
and immediate" from more contingent consequences).
89. Compare State v. LaForest, 665 A.2d 1083 (N.H. 1995) (holding that a
court may enforce a plea where the defendant waived his discovery right to
interview the victim, and the plea offer was to be withdrawn if defendant
attempted discovery), with State v. Rivest, 316 N.W.2d 395 (Wis. 1982) (holding
that a prosecutor may rescind a plea offer where the defendant falsely described
his minor involvement in a crime, and a second team of police investigators,
after a guilty plea, discovered that defendant had misled police).
90. See, e.g., State v. Wakefield, 925 P.2d 183 (Wash. 1996) (concerning
illegal judicial involvement in a plea where the judge accepted a plea with an
implied promise of a mid-level sentence and then gave the maximum sentence).
91. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 1356. Miller & Wright here
include State v. Parker, 640 A.2d 1104 (Md. 1994). Parker had been convicted on
state and federal charges for bank robbery; he pleaded guilty in state court
under a deal that contemplated that he could serve his state sentence in federal
prison (a safer venue for informers), but, ironically, he was paroled by the
federal authorities and hence left to return to state prison. Recognizing that it
had no power to force the federal prison to re-accept him, the state court gave
him the choice between serving the sentence in state prison or rescinding the
original plea, and facing retrial years after the original case.
92. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
93. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 1408-21.
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charges, Miller & Wright actually include the doctrine
itself
94
Miller & Wright's treatment of lawyer ethics is not
extensive. Instead of relying, as most books do, chiefly on
Nix v. Whiteside," they look to the subtler questions of
ethics and discovery, such as a lawyer's role in sting
operations or in threats of criminal charges."
It is almost impossible to discuss sentencing in
casebooks. The effort is made in both procedure and
substantive criminal law books, and the problem, of course,
is the absence of what is conventionally thought of as law or
doctrine which students can learn. After all, what law is
there to teach? The choice lies between broad themes and
methodologies on the one hand, and highly specific rules
and varied structures on the other. It may well be that few
teachers will ever touch this material out of either lack of
time, or concern that there is no teachable or testable
material in the area. Miller & Wright, though themselves
prominent scholars of the federal sentencing guidelines,
tread lightly in this area. They finesse the categorical
change in sentencing wrought by both state and federal
guidelines by attempting a unified, thematic approach.
Thus, their key example of the general "methodology" of
sentencing is the Oliver North case,97 which is pre-
Guidelines. One special innovation merits note here-in
line with their willingness to use substaitive criminal law
doctrine to illuminate police procedure, they are surely the
first casebook editors to introduce the bizarre phenomenon
of federal "sentencing entrapment" as a defense."
The book does have its flaws. It has surprisingly little
material on Fourth Amendment tort suits and
administrative remedies.99 If Miller & Wright's position is
that these suits are futile and that their availability is an
empty symbol, they might well have offered far more
detailed empirical evidence for this, especially in light of
94. See id. at 1458-65. (including Bailey v. State, 669 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 1996)
(citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896))).
95. 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that a defense lawyer may not assist client
in presenting false evidence).
96. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 1588-99.
97. Id. at 1608-11.
98. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 1645-50.
99. See id. at 430-49.
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their commitment in other chapters to lay out the socio-
dynamics of criminal justice.
The matter of effective assistance of counsel is a more
complicated case for criticism. Miller & Wright offer a
surprisingly generic treatment of Strickland v.
Washington,' with nothing on the sociology of case-specific
ineffectiveness. Yet they compensate with some rarely
noted state caselaw on the limited state-supplied right of
counsel in civil DWI cases and other civil deprivations.
The chapter on discovery is also not as complete as it
could be. Casebooks always use Brady v. Maryland, °2 or its
progeny, United States v. Agurs0 ' or United States v.
Bagley, to illustrate the limited constitutional due process
right of defense discovery of exculpatory evidence.
Casebooks also use Williams v. Florida"° to show where
prosecution discovery of defense alibi claims does not
infringe the privilege against self-incrimination. But most
of discovery doctrine in Miller & Wright's casebook lies in
the devilish details covered only by statutory,
administrative, or purely discretionary guidelines. Miller &
Wright are surprisingly under-responsive to this problem,
taking the conventional approach of front-loading the
constitutional issues and covering rules and local practices
mainly as an afterthought.
Nevertheless, the achievements of the book are
prodigious, and the challenge to instructors is clear. Miller
& Wright make a good case for the possibility of teaching
the real practice of criminal justice while still providing
enough of a legalistic framework for students to exercise all
the usual lawyerly and analytic skills. Indeed, if cast in
terms of federalism and separation-of-powers analysis, the
book can be justified as being even truer to Supreme Court
doctrine than the conventions of pure Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
100. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
101. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 831.
102. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
103. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
104. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
105. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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